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I
INTRODUCTION

In a recent keynote address on professional responsibility, Supreme Court
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg recounted a well-loved story about a student's first
encounter with legal ethics. The professor in one of the core first-year courses
was describing a lawyer's tactic that left the student "bothered and bewildered."
"But what about ethics?," the student asked. "Ethics," the professor frostily
informed him, "is taught in the second year." 1
For most of its history, however, American legal education has aspired to
teach professional responsibility by a more pervasive method.2 This essay
charts efforts to realize that aspiration, not just in theory but in practice.
Since the mid-1970s, the American Bar Association has required accredited
law schools to provide instruction in professional responsibility.' Although the
vast majority have met that requirement through a mandatory ethics course,
some schools, including my home institution, Stanford University Law School,
have chosen instead to integrate ethical issues into the core curriculum. A still
smaller number of schools has combined these approaches. This essay reviews
the rewards and the challenges of pervasive ethics initiatives.
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1. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Supreme Court Pronouncements on the Conduct of Lawyers,
Keynote Address at the Hofstra University Law School Conference on Legal Ethics: The Core Issues
(Mar. 10, 1996).
2. The pervasive method of legal ethics education refers to the process of incorporating ethics
instruction into all aspects of the legal curriculum. Under this approach, many substantive courses
would devote a portion of class time to studying questions of professional responsibility.
3. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SfANDARDS FOR THE APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS std.
302(a)(iv) (1993) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS]. The Standards mandate that accredited law schools
"require of all candidates... instruction in the duties and responsibilities of the legal profession. Such
required instruction need not be limited to any pedagogical method as long as the history, goals,
structure, and responsibilities of the legal profession and its members, including the ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, are all covered." Id.
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I have argued at length elsewhere that law schools should address issues of
professional responsibility throughout the curriculum as well as in specialized
courses.4 I will not restate that argument here except to note its central
premise: Legal ethics deserves discussion in all substantive areas because it
arises in all substantive areas. Faculty who decline, explicitly or implicitly, to
address ethical issues encourage future practitioners to do the same. To confine
professional responsibility discussions to a single required course marginalizes
their importance and undermines their most important message: that moral
responsibility is a crucial constituent of all legal practice. This essay is directed
to audiences who share that view or who are at least interested in its curricular
implications.
The rewards of a pervasive approach to professional responsibility
instruction are substantial, but so are the barriers to realizing them. Stanford's
experience is illuminating on both counts. Its initiatives, together with similar
efforts at other institutions, suggest some general insights about the value of
curricular integration.
This essay begins in Part II by examining the central features of effective
professional responsibility instruction. Part III then addresses the most common
criticisms of legal ethics curricula. Part IV concludes by suggesting that the
most successful approach is likely to combine pervasive instruction and some
required courses.
II
EFFECTIVE ETHICS INSTRUCTION

David Luban, my coauthor on a legal ethics casebook, once opened a
workshop on teaching legal ethics with Tolstoy's observation that every unhappy
family is unhappy in its own way.' Luban went on to suggest that the same is
true of every professional responsibility course. There are inherent problems
and infinite ways to fail in teaching this subject, particularly to captive graduatelevel audiences. I personally have experimented with most forms of failure, and
the following discussion builds on the experiences that I have not yet managed
to repress.
Over the last sixteen years, I have taught professional responsibility at
various law schools and in various incarnations. My experiences have included
mandatory upperlevel courses ranging from fifty to 150 students, small seminars
of under ten students, and almost everything in between. Some of these courses
have provided a brief overview for first-year students or an advanced, intensive
program for third-year students. I have relied on lectures, role-plays, case
histories, hypothetical problems, videos, and guests from practice and related
academic disciplines.
4. DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD

3-8 (1994); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEGAL EDUc. 31 (1992).
5. David Luban, Epistemology and Moral Education, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 636 (1983).
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The one context in which I have not taught professional responsibility is
clinics, and, partly for that reason, I am convinced that they may be the best
settings for such instruction.6 However, they are also one of the most expensive
ways of teaching legal ethics and should not be a substitute either for the
pervasive approach or for classes focusing on specialized issues such as bar
regulatory structures. Indeed, to give clinics a monopoly on professional
responsibility instruction would further marginalize its significance in the eyes
of many faculty and students.
My experience with various teaching formats, together with secondary
literature, student and faculty survey responses, and war stories from other
colleagues, leads me to several general conclusions and one overarching
disclaimer.7 The disclaimer falls along the lines of the social science clichd that
no generalization is worth anything, including this one. For every tendency that
I am about to describe, there are multiple exceptions. Any strategy has
tradeoffs. Gifted teachers can succeed with almost any professional responsibility approach; unmotivated or uninformed teachers can mess up the most
engaging material. But accumulated wisdom on ethics instruction suggests that
some approaches are more likely to work than others. Effective programs
generally require a strong institutional commitment to the subject, together with
well-structured course materials and methods for evaluating student performance. Other important features include interactive teaching formats,
opportunities for faculty and student choice, and tolerant classroom approaches
that are neither value-neutral nor overly rule-bound.
A. Institutional Commitment
The most important characteristic of effective professional responsibility
programs is the message that the subject is itself important. Although few
faculty would disagree in principle, they can inadvertently sabotage that signal
in practice. Failure to include significant ethics material in course assignments,

6. For an argument about the comparative virtues of clinical approaches, see David Luban &
Michael Millemann, Good Judgement. Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31
(1995). For general discussion of the value of such approaches, see Mary C. Daly et al., Contextualizing
ProfessionalResponsibility: A New Curriculumfor a New Century, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 193
(Summer/Autumn 1995); Christine Mary Venter, EncouragingPersonalResponsibility-An Alternative
Approach to Teaching Legal Ethics, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 287 (Summer/Autumn 1995). Some
of the same advantages can be achieved through simulation. See Robert P. Burns, Teaching the Basic
Ethics Class through Simulation: The Northwestern Programin Advocacy and Professionalism,58 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBs. 37 (Summer/Autumn 1995).
7. My data include a survey of the entire Stanford student body in 1991 (response rate 40%), a
survey of the first year Stanford class in 1994 (response rate 74%), and a survey of 155 second- and
third-year students enrolled in my 1995 New York University professional responsibility class (response
rate 33%). About two-thirds of the entire Stanford faculty completed questionnaires in 1991, and about
one-third of participating faculty completed questionnaires in 1995. Both student and faculty
questionnaires focused on the desirability and adequacy of instruction through the pervasive method
and through a required ethics course. Copies of all surveys and questionnaires are on file with the
author.
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in classroom discussions, and in exams or written assignments will undercut the
basic purpose of required coverage.
The most common problem is reliance on a pervasive approach that is not,
in fact, pervasive. Although Stanford has long struggled with that problem, it
has also made striking progress. After years of gentle administrative prodding
by Dean Paul Brest, the school recently made a major effort to strengthen
faculty support. With substantial assistance from the W.M. Keck Foundation,
that effort has now produced an impressive institutional commitment. In the
fall of 1994 and 1995, all Stanford faculty members teaching mandatory firstyear courses agreed to set aside at least two full class hours for ethical
discussion, accompanied by significant written materials! In addition, first-year
students have been required to attend a number of special professional
responsibility programs and to complete an exercise or written assignment. The
programs have been subject to ongoing evaluation and revision. In the spring
of 1996, the faculty decided to encourage but not require first-year instructors
to continue covering professional responsibility issues. The faculty also added
a requirement that students complete at least one unit of upperlevel instruction
in ethics, either through a basic professional responsibility course or through
other substantive courses that include significant ethics material.
These curricular initiatives reflect a significant advance over preceding years.
First-year courses now consistently cover substantial legal ethics material, much
of it published in ProfessionalResponsibility: Ethics by the Pervasive Method.9
The book includes nine chapters that survey core concepts in professional
responsibility and ten chapters that integrate ethical issues into basic first-year
and upperlevel courses.'0 At Stanford, the core-concept chapters form the
basis of the introductory professional responsibility sessions for first-year
students and the foundation for an upperlevel elective professional responsibility
course. The substantive chapters provide material that professors may adapt for
their individual classes.
This material raises a broad range of issues that corresponds to the
substantive framework of leading casebooks. Coverage includes relevant
provisions of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, as well as leading cases, scholarly and journalistic
commentary, bar ethics rulings, and related interdisciplinary material. These
selections are structured around hypothetical problems that are not entirely
hypothetical. Almost all of them draw on actual situations involving real lives

8. Through support from the W.M. Keck Foundation, faculty were eligible for summer stipends
to add materials for first-year courses. Some professors also received more substantial stipends to
develop upperlevel courses that devoted substantial attention to ethics issues.
9. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 4.
10. The overview chapters address the following: traditions of moral reasoning; regulation of the
profession; the advocate's role; the adversary system; confidentiality; conflicts of interest; negotiation
and mediation; and the lawyer-client relationship. The substantive chapters involve civil procedure,
constitutional law, contracts, corporate law, criminal law and procedure, evidence and trial advocacy,
family law, property, tax, and torts.
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and real consequences. Many professors add or substitute other texts, legal
cases, videotapes, and presentations by practitioners.
To assist faculty in course preparation, Stanford's Keck Center now
distributes an annotated bibliography of innovative teaching materials on legal
ethics and the legal profession." This bibliography includes both published
and unpublished texts and videos, indexed by author and subject matter. The
point of this bibliography, as well as my own text on the pervasive method, is
to accommodate a wide variety of teaching preferences and priorities. 2
Although substantial room for progress remains, the availability of such
materials, together with an increased institutional commitment, has greatly
improved Stanford's ethics program. In recent surveys, most students indicated
that professional responsibility is an important and interesting topic, and that
professors who are committed to the subject provide effective instruction.
However, questionnaire responses also revealed that ethics discussions are still
not sufficiently frequent nor well integrated into first-year courses. As one
student noted, professional responsibility coverage too often seems "somewhat
of an add on.. . . It feels like we are [only] doing an obligatory ethics problem
here and there" rather than engaging in sustained analysis.
Students also commented on a related problem: Professors who subtly or not
so subtly conveyed a sense that ethics is unimportant. A few faculty members
saved professional responsibility issues for "the last five minutes of class," made
clear that such issues would not be on the exam, or appeared apologetic about
having to take "time away from the 'substance' of the course." Picking up on
these cues, some students did not treat ethics issues seriously; they neither did
the reading nor took notes on class discussions. This, in turn, reinforced certain
faculty members' reluctance to devote substantial time to professional
responsibility concerns. The result was a self-perpetuating cycle. As one
professor concluded, "Unless I test on it (which would alter my course
substantially), the students treat [ethics material] as a lark."
The solution follows obviously from the diagnosis. Pervasive ethics will
work only if professors are in fact willing to alter their courses and to include
ethics issues on exams. Summarizing a common view, one student concluded
that "ethics should definitely be incorporated into all of the courses. . . . But
there needs to be more of [a] real commitment to do that."
A related problem involves over-reliance on supplemental ungraded ethics
programs. Scheduling these events when students have strong competing
concerns can exacerbate the problem. Like other law schools, Stanford has had
mixed experience with including special ethics programs during orientation
week. Attempting to convey crucial substantive material in these sessions is
usually a mistake; first-year students are more likely to worry about whether
11. The bibliography is reprinted in this issue of Law and Contemporary Problems. Deborah L.
Rhode, Annotated Bibliography of Materials on Teaching Legal Ethics, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.

363 (Summer/Autumn 1995).
12. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 4.
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they can get their phones connected than whether they understand the
difference between the Model Code and the Model Rules. However, raising
ethical issues at the outset of law school can also have significant symbolic
value. The challenge is to find compelling material, such as film, case history,
or a panel on a controversial topic that engages without overwhelming students.
Another common problem is scheduling intensive ungraded programs
without giving students enough release time from other course work. Stanford
once made this mistake by requiring participation in a negotiation exercise as
a supplement to regular courseloads. Student questionnaire responses revealed
significant resentment. Comments also centered on the "tacit statement" of
priorities that an ungraded exercise conveyed. As one student concluded,
"people will get into [ethics coursework]," but only if "it's graded and taught
with enthusiasm."
B. Interactive Formats
When it comes to class size, smaller is better in most law school contexts,
but even more so in professional responsibility courses. Legal ethics instruction
needs settings that encourage broad-based participation, candid interchanges,
and direct personal engagement. This is the consensus of most experts,
including those who study moral education. Recent studies find that interactive
learning, such as problem solving and role playing, is the best way of enhancing
skills in moral analysis. 3
Stanford's experience bears this out. The pervasive ethics initiative that
students rated highest in 1994 was a negotiation exercise. Developed under a
Keck Foundation grant at Columbia Law School, the exercise involved twoperson teams that represented either the husband or wife in a divorce case.
Students had to grapple with a broad range of issues including client fraud,
coercive tactics, lawyer-client conflicts of interest, and concerns of an unrepresented child. Many participants liked this opportunity to address concrete
problems and to see how they and their classmates would react "when put in a
real life situation." For some students, the exercise was a sobering reminder
that "ethics is easier said than done" and an example of "how ethical resolve
can be shaken in practice." For other individuals, role playing offered a
welcome "break from the monotony" of large lectures and abstract discussions.
Students at other law schools make similar points. It is, as one individual noted,

13. James Rest & Stephen J. Thoma, Educational Programs and Interventions, in MORAL
DEVELOPMENT: ADVANCES IN RESEARCH AND THEORY 59-78 (James Rest et al. eds., 1986); Joseph
Volker, Life Experiencesand Developmental Pathways,in MORAL DEVELOPMENT, supra,at 3, 14,31-42;

James E. Molitemo, An Analysis of Ethics Teaching in Law Schools: Replacing Lost Benefits of the
Apprentice System in the Academic Atmosphere, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 83 (1991); James E. Moliterno,

Teaching Legal Ethics in a Program of Comprehensive Skills Development, 15 J. LEGAL PROF. 145
(1990); Donnie J. Self et al., The Effect of Teaching Medical Ethics on Medical Students' Moral
Reasoning, 64 ACAD. MED. 755-59 (1989).
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"not easy to discuss Durkheim with a hundred of your closest friends. 1 4 Nor
are such discussions likely to be as valuable for most individuals as are more
practice-oriented interchanges in smaller classroom settings.
C. Faculty and Student Choice
Nothing poisons the classroom atmosphere more than individuals who do
not want to be there. As subsequent discussion indicates, a substantial number
of faculty and students feel that way about legal ethics discussions. The
problem is not wholly avoidable as long as accreditation standards require law
schools to provide professional responsibility instruction. If a school decides
(appropriately in my view) that such instruction will be effective only if
integrated throughout the curriculum, then some professors probably will be
unwilling participants in the enterprise.
It is possible, however, to reduce resistance by giving students and faculty
a measure of choice about their involvement. At Stanford, for example, firstyear teachers who do not wish to provide professional responsibility instruction
have had the option of giving up class hours for programs taught by colleagues
and visiting practitioners. Upperlevel students will now have the oppotunity to
satisfy their ethics requirement by completing either the basic professional
responsibility class, or some other elective that presents significant ethics
material, such as Negotiation, Trial Advocacy, Tax, Family Law, Criminal
Defense, or Prosecution.
Any method of handling professional responsibility requirements presents
tradeoffs. Allowing first-year professors to opt out or to cede their ethics time
to special programs is hardly an ideal solution; that strategy discourages students
from raising ethics questions at other points during the semester and makes it
difficult to include such material on the final exam. Law schools teach in
subtexts as well as texts, and a faculty member's pervasive silence about
professional responsibility sends a clear and counterproductive message. Yet as
student evaluations also make clear, reluctant coverage sends the same signal
and occupies time that could more profitably be spent by colleagues committed
to the enterprise. On balance, an opt-out provision for faculty makes sense. It
is encouraging that, in the last two years at Stanford, faculty have rarely chosen
that option.
Students, however, should not receive the same prerogative, since those who
are likely to exercise it may be the ones who most need exposure to ethics
issues. But maximizing choice for students is more likely to promote engaged
discussion than requiring everyone to take a standardized professional
responsibility class. That is particularly true if the requirement involves an
upperlevel course. As Stephen Bundy notes, "the requirement chafe[s] more

14. Stephen McG. Bundy, Ethics Education in the First Year: An Experiment,58 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 19 (Summer/Autumn 1995).
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severely once students [have] had a taste of freedom in course selection. 1 5
Yet there are also advantages in putting mandatory coverage in the second or
third year; students have a better understanding of professional responsibility
issues after they have had broader exposure to legal rules and practice norms.
It also helps if individuals are able to ground their ethics discussions in the
substantive areas that hold greatest interest to them personally. One of
Stanford students' principal criticisms of the first-year program was that some
of the sessions, particularly the materials on criminal practice and family law,
did not seem relevant to their own career plans. While that difficulty cannot be
escaped entirely, it can be mitigated by focusing on diverse practice areas in the
first year and by offering a variety of ethics-related electives in the second and
third years.
Choice is equally critical in the course material available for curricular
integration. As noted earlier, my text on teaching ethics pervasively attempts
to accommodate different teaching approaches by including a broad array of
issues and an equally wide range of doctrinal and interdisciplinary material. The
text also offers opportunities to address questions involving race, class, and
gender, which are not always well represented in casebooks. For example, my
chapter on constitutional law includes ethical problems concerning government
lawyers' responsibilities in the World War II Japanese internment cases, class
action counsels' obligations in school desegregation cases, and feminist
advocates' difficulties in identifying "women's interests" on issues like pornography regulation. 6 How best to address such concerns will, of course, vary
considerably among law school classes. To structure effective presentations,
faculty need a broad menu of materials from which to choose.
D. Classroom Tolerance and Codified Standards
Professional responsibility inevitably involves issues of personal responsibility on which students have strong views. The challenge for legal education is to
create classroom atmospheres that encourage candid and self-critical exploration
of competing values. Problems run in two quite different directions. One risk
is that professors will allow their own perspectives to dominate discussion and
stifle opposing views. Alternatively, if faculty studiously avoid taking a position,
the course can end up undermining moral judgment. By offering students a
steady diet of seemingly insoluble dilemmas, professional responsibility classes
can inadvertently foster skepticism, relativism, and cynicism. Moreover, since
total objectivity is never possible, faculty who attempt such a stance often are
masking values that should be open for challenge.
The preferable alternative is a classroom climate that encourages toleration
without eroding commitment. While on many issues there are no objectively
valid answers, not all answers are equally valid. Some are more consistent,

15. Id. at 22.
16. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 4, at 506-25.
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coherent, and respectful of evidence. Nor do all issues of professional ethics
present intractable personal dilemmas. Many regulatory issues call for the same
skills of legal interpretation and policy analysis that are standard fare in other
law school classes. We do not expect faculty or students to suspend judgment
in those contexts; we should view professional responsibility courses no
differently.
A related set of risks involves the role of bar ethical codes in shaping ethics
curricula. Here again, the difficulties run in opposite directions. As William
Simon has noted, rule-bound courses that focus on preparing students for the
bar can readily turn into legal ethics without the ethics.1 7 In contexts where
codified standards are ambiguous, silent, self-serving, or undemanding, students
need exposure to competing perspectives. Yet professors who try to teach a
course in moral philosophy will end up alienating or speaking past a substantial
part of their audience. In one telling case, a student (not at Stanford) advised
a classmate to avoid taking a particular professional responsibility course
because the professor "asks a lot of uncomfortable questions about what you
think is right and never spends any time teaching the rules ....
The difficulty in striking the right balance between codes and more valueladen materials is compounded by students' inconsistent preferences. Some
responses to the Stanford survey favored greater attention to the rules, a focus
that appeared preferable to "meandering dorm-like discussions" of moral issues.
By contrast, other students found the rules "useless-they tell you how to get
around being ethical not how to be ethical."
These challenges in structuring an effective professional responsibility class
are not unique to this subject. Any course can present similar Goldilocks
dilemmas: Teachers can always provide too much or not enough of their own
views or of codified rules. Moreover, faculty who are truly committed to the
subject can often succeed with approaches that fall on either side of the
continuum.
Interestingly enough, the two Stanford professors who received the most
positive ethics evaluations for first-year courses employed quite different
approaches. 9 One was contracts professor who set aside two full class sessions
for professional responsibility discussions. She assigned material from my text
concerning issues of duress, undue influence, unconscionability, and unilateral
mistakes. Included in this material was a representative range of questions
involving professional responsibility. For example, what are lawyers' obligations
of candor, confidentiality, and client loyalty when they know that an opposing
party is ignorant of a material fact or is about to sign a contract with an

17. William H. Simon, The Trouble With Legal Ethics, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 65, 66 (1991).
18. Daniel S. Kleinberger, Ethos and Conscience-A Rejoinder, 21 CONN. L. REV. 397, 401 n.23
(1989).
19. These approaches are analyzed in depth in Jon Blazer, Student Responses to Stanford Law
School's Efforts at Pervasive Ethics Instruction (1995) (unpublished student paper, on file with the
author).
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unenforceable clause? What kinds of contractual conditions can law firms
impose on departing partners? Should attorney whistleblowers have rights to
sue for wrongful discharge? Under what, if any circumstances should lawyers
police the fairness of a bargain? Such questions provide opportunities to focus
both on Model Rule provisions and on broader issues of professional conduct.
Students generally liked the mix, and several noted with approval that this
professor was not "afraid to say some behavior is flat out unethical."
By contrast, another faculty member was equally successful with a less
structured and less rule-oriented approach. Her course on civil procedure
integrated ethics issues into multiple class sessions, relied more heavily on
spontaneous discussions, and focused students' attention on how they personally
would resolve difficult dilemmas. An invited practitioner who discussed
professional responsibility issues in sexual harassment cases was also highly
effective. Her presentation underscored the relevance of ethical questions in
daily practice.
Such examples reinforce the point noted earlier; commitment to the subject
is more crucial than choice of technique. But it is also true that efforts to build
such commitment bump up against some long-standing obstacles. Reservations
about the value of professional responsibility instruction remain common among
both faculty and students. As the following discussion suggests, efforts to
address such skepticism should be a central part of any curricular integration
program.
III
THE RATIONALE FOR PERVASIVE ETHICS

Although an extended defense of professional responsibility instruction is
beyond the scope of this article, the two most common objections deserve at
least brief review. One criticism involves the ineffectiveness of moral education
in general; the other concerns problems with curricular integration in particular.
A. Legal Education, Ethical Values, and Ethical Conduct
The first objection is that postgraduate education in moral responsibility
offers too little too late. As one Stanford student put it, "trying to teach ethical
standards in the classroom is a total waste of time-mere discussion won't
change attitudes that have been shaped by twenty-odd years of experience."

Another student added, "[u]nless there is something that we need to know that
we didn't learn in kindergarten, it's not worth the time or money. Not only are

there many important and opaque legal issues we learn in [our] first year, but
we're paying $20,000 to spend our time on them." A related claim is that even
if law school education has some marginal effect on student attitudes, it will
have little impact on their later practice. Moral conduct is highly situational,
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and critics argue that contextual pressures are likely to dwarf any lingering
effects of classroom moralizing.2"
There is something to these claims, but not nearly as much as some faculty
and students imagine. First, ethical values are by no means as fixed as critics
contend. Recent psychological research indicates that significant changes occur
during early adulthood in peoples' basic strategies for dealing with moral
issues.2 Through interactive education, individuals can enhance skills in
ethical analysis and increase their awareness of the situational factors that skew
judgment. Over 100 studies evaluating ethics courses find that well designed
curricula can significantly improve capacities for moral reasoning.22
Moreover, not all professional responsibility issues involve matters of deep
moral significance. Some concern bar regulatory standards and legal decisions
that students will not have encountered before law school and that are not
qualitatively different from the material in other courses. Even on more valueladen issues, professional standards sometimes depart from what personal moral
intuitions might dictate. Future practitioners need to know where the bar draws
the lines before they are in a position to cross one.
Despite the importance of situational pressures, psychological research also
generally finds some modest relationship between moral judgment and moral
behavior. 3 How individuals evaluate the consequences of their actions can be
critical in shaping conduct, and education can affect those evaluative processes.
It can also make individuals aware of ways that economic incentives, peer
pressures, structures of authority, and diffusion of responsibility affect decisionmaking.24 Most lawyers who have taken legal ethics courses give them some
credit for helping to resolve ethical issues in practice.' Surveyed lawyers and
students also have favored maintaining or expanding ethics coverage in law

20. A vast array of research documents the variability of moral conduct in response to stress,
competition, authority, peer influence, financial incentives, and time pressure. See the studies
summarized in Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, supra note 4.
21. James R. Rest, Can Ethics be Taught in Professional Schools? The Psychological Research, in
EASIER SAID THAN DONE 22, 23-24 (1988); James R. Rest et al., An Overview of the Psychology of
Morality, in MORAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note 13, at 3, 14.
22. Rest, supra note 21, at 23-24; see also James S. Leming, CurricularEffectiveness in Moral/Values
Education:A Review of Research, 10 J. MORAL EDUC. 147 (1981).
23. Albert Bandura, Social Cognitive Theory of Moral Thought and Action, in HANDBOOK OF
MORAL BEHAVIOR AND DEVELOPMENT 45, 53 (William M. Kurtines & Jacob L. Gerwitz eds., 1991);
Walter Mischel & Harriet N. Mischel, A Cognitive Social-Learning Approach to Morality and SelfRegulation, in MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND SOCIAL ISSUES 84,
101-07 (Thomas Likona ed., 1976); Augusto Blasi, Bridging Moral Cognition and Moral Action: A
Critical Review of the Literature, 88 PSYCHOL. BULL. 1 (1980)(concluding that most recent studies
suggest a correlation between developmental stages in moral reasoning and altruism, honesty, and
resistance to peer pressure).
24. For discussion of these general goals of professional responsibility instruction, see David B.
Wilkins, Redefining the "Professional"in ProfessionalEthics:An InterdisciplinaryApproach to Teaching
Professionalism, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241 (Summer/Autumn 1995).
25. FRANCES K. ZEMANS & VICTOR G. ROSENBLUM, THE MAKING OF A PUBLIC PROFESSION 17677 (1981).
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schools.26 Indeed, four out of five Stanford students want professors to devote
more attention to professional responsibility issues. There is, in short, stronger
evidence concerning the value of professional responsibility instruction than of
most legal education."
B. Curricular Integration
For some faculty and students, the problem is not legal ethics instruction per
se but rather the attempts to integrate it into the core curriculum. Opponents
raise two primary concerns, one practical, the other personal. The first concern
is that curricular integration risks unsystematic and uninformed coverage. Many
issues, such as candor, confidentiality, and conflicts of interest, cut across
substantive areas. A pervasive method risks shallow and repetitive treatment,
rather than the in-depth coverage available in a single, focused course. Other
issues, such as bar regulatory structures, seldom arise naturally outside of
professional responsibility classes. As Stephen Bundy notes,
by giving the pieces of legal ethics a home everywhere, [an exclusively pervasive
approach] effectively deprives its core concepts of a home anywhere ....

[Students]

need a place ... [to] confront in any probing or systematic way, the central ethical
concepts.., and regulatory alternatives that underlie all areas of professional ethics
and regulation.28

The obvious answer to this objection is that pervasive coverage should serve
to supplement, not substitute for, separate coursework focused specifically on
ethics. Minimal coordination can prevent substantial gaps or overlaps. Stanford
has attempted to minimize such problems by surveying first-year faculty about
their intended materials and holding one general meeting to discuss these plans.
The second major concern is that most faculty jack expertise in legal ethics
issues. This has an equally straightforward solution. It is not difficult to
develop familiarity with some basic professional responsibility concerns that fit
naturally with substantive coverage. Course materials specifically designed for
that purpose are now readily accessible.29
Of course, some professors will always feel discomfort wandering into a
substantive area outside their expertise. This is especially true of issues like
conflicts of interest, which have attracted an increasingly complex body of law.
A little knowledge feels like a dangerous thing. But an increasing array of
background materials is now available to address those concerns. A major
objective of my own pervasive ethics text is to put in broader context
professional responsibility topics that arise in core courses. To that end, my
book includes extensive cross references; it links problems in substantive law
chapters such as contracts and torts to relevant overview chapters on confidenti26. Id. at 180.
27. Zemans and Rosenblum's study suggests that legal education in general does a poor job in
preparing future lawyers for many of the tasks that are most crucial in practice. See generally id.
28. Bundy, supra note 14, at [text with note 28].
29. See RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 4. A full bibliography of such
materials is available from the Keck Center on Legal Ethics and the Legal Profession at Stanford.
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ality, conflicts of interest, the advocate's role, and so forth. Professors who want
to make sure that they fully understand the applicable rules and policy considerations can read this overview material and assign or summarize any part that
they find important for their own subject area. An extensive teacher's manual
provides further assistance and helps nonexperts anticipate students' questions
and concerns.
The real problem is not that most faculty are unable to address professional
responsibility issues with reasonable competence in core courses. It is rather
that some would prefer not to do so. Individuals who already feel overextended
may not want to invest the start-up costs in mastering new materials. Others
worry about entrapment in "touchy feely" or platitudinous discussions."
Conversations involving personal moral commitments often appear
particularly difficult to structure. Many students are especially invested in ethical
questions. They can also be intolerant and insufficiently self-critical in their
views, and readily frustrated by constraints on participation in large classes. The
simplest way for faculty to avoid these difficulties is to avoid any topic that
produces them. As one Stanford professor candidly put it, "[p]ersonally, I
would prefer to teach torts. Can't the experts do this [ethics material]?" Well,
of course we can, and at most schools, we do. But as earlier discussion
suggested, this delegation also carries a cost. Treating professional responsibility
as someone else's responsibility encourages future lawyers to do the same.
IV
CONCLUSION

While integrating ethical issues poses some special challenges, it also offers
some special rewards. For many students, these discussions are among their
most memorable classroom experiences. At issue is how individuals want to live
their professional lives, and students' interest in that topic is frequently
infectious. Even faculty who never would have wandered voluntarily into the
valley of ethics often end up liking the visit.
Such experiences are, in my view, the most positive legacy of Stanford's
pervasive ethics program. A substantial number of professors who once
believed that "their" course was not about "that" now have stumbled on topics
that they find interesting and important. Some even report that professional
responsibility discussions are among their most successful classes.
It is a small step, but that, I suspect, is how curricula always evolve. We will
need to lure, prod, and cajole colleagues into entering the valley of ethics, one
by one, institution by institution. Many will be glad we did. Legal education
will be richer for the effort. Law schools have long proclaimed their
commitment to professional responsibility. It is time to translate rhetorical
allegiance into curricular priorities.

30. See sources summarized in Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, supra note 4.

